keepkey_firmware

Format String vulnerability in KeepKey version 4.0.0 allows attackers to trigger information display (of information that should not be accessible), related to text containing characters that the device’s font lacks.

Insufficient checks in the finite state machine of the ShapeShift KeepKey hardware wallet before firmware 6.2.2 allow a partial reset of cryptographic secrets to known values via crafted messages. Notably, this breaks the security of U2F for new server registrations and invalidates existing registrations. This vulnerability can be exploited by unauthenticated attackers and the interface is reachable via WebUSB.

** DISPUTED ** On ShapeShift KeepKey devices, a side channel for the row-based OLED display was found. The power consumption of each row-based display cycle depends on the number of illuminated pixels, allowing a partial recovery of display contents. For example, a hardware implant in the USB cable might be able to leverage this behavior to recover secret data shown on the display. In other words, the side channel is relevant only if the attacker has enough control over the device’s USB connection to make power-consumption measurements at a time when secret data is displayed. The side channel is not relevant in other circumstances, such as a stolen device that is not currently displaying secret data. NOTE: the vendor’s position is that there is “insignificant risk.”

Insufficient length checks in the ShapeShift KeepKey hardware wallet firmware before 7.1.0 allow a stack buffer overflow via crafted messages. The overflow in ethereum_extractThorchainSwapData() in ethereum.c can circumvent stack protections and lead to code execution. The vulnerable interface is reachable remotely over WebUSB.