CVE’s

MiR controllers across firmware versions 2.8.1.1 and before do not encrypt or protect in any way the intellectual property artifacts installed in the robots. This flaw allows attackers with access to the robot or the robot network (while in combination with other flaws) to retrieve and easily exfiltrate all installed intellectual property and data.

MiR100, MiR200 and other MiR robots use the Robot Operating System (ROS) default packages exposing the computational graph without any sort of authentication. This allows attackers with access to the internal wireless and wired networks to take control of the robot seamlessly. In combination with CVE-2020-10269 and CVE-2020-10271, this flaw allows malicious actors to command the robot at desire.

MiR100, MiR200 and other MiR robots use the Robot Operating System (ROS) default packages exposing the computational graph to all network interfaces, wireless and wired. This is the result of a bad set up and can be mitigated by appropriately configuring ROS and/or applying custom patches as appropriate. Currently, the ROS computational graph can be accessed fully from the wired exposed ports. In combination with other flaws such as CVE-2020-10269, the computation graph can also be fetched and interacted from wireless networks. This allows a malicious operator to take control of the ROS logic and correspondingly, the complete robot given that MiR's operations are centered around the framework (ROS).

Out of the wired and wireless interfaces within MiR100, MiR200 and other vehicles from the MiR fleet, it's possible to access the Control Dashboard on a hardcoded IP address. Credentials to such wireless interface default to well known and widely spread users (omitted) and passwords (omitted). This information is also available in past User Guides and manuals which the vendor distributed. This flaw allows cyber attackers to take control of the robot remotely and make use of the default user interfaces MiR has created, lowering the complexity of attacks and making them available to entry-level attackers. More elaborated attacks can also be established by clearing authentication and sending network requests directly. We have confirmed this flaw in MiR100 and MiR200 but according to the vendor, it might also apply to MiR250, MiR500 and MiR1000.

An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists in the way that the Windows Kernel handles objects in memory, aka 'Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability'. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2020-0913, CVE-2020-1000, CVE-2020-1003.

One of the wireless interfaces within MiR100, MiR200 and possibly (according to the vendor) other MiR fleet vehicles comes pre-configured in WiFi Master (Access Point) mode. Credentials to such wireless Access Point default to well known and widely spread SSID (MiR_RXXXX) and passwords (omitted). This information is also available in past User Guides and manuals which the vendor distributed. We have confirmed this flaw in MiR100 and MiR200 but it might also apply to MiR250, MiR500 and MiR1000.

Critical services for operation can be terminated from windows task manager, bringing the manipulator to a halt. After this a Re-Calibration of the brakes needs to be performed. Be noted that this only can be accomplished either by a Kuka technician or by Kuka issued calibration hardware that interfaces with the manipulator furthering the delay and increasing operational costs.

Universal Robots control box CB 3.1 across firmware versions (tested on 1.12.1, 1.12, 1.11 and 1.10) does not encrypt or protect in any way the intellectual property artifacts installed from the UR+ platform of hardware and software components (URCaps). These files (*.urcaps) are stored under '/root/.urcaps' as plain zip files containing all the logic to add functionality to the UR3, UR5 and UR10 robots. This flaw allows attackers with access to the robot or the robot network (while in combination with other flaws) to retrieve and easily exfiltrate all installed intellectual property.

UR+ (Universal Robots+) is a platform of hardware and software component sellers, for Universal Robots robots. When installing any of these components in the robots (e.g. in the UR10), no integrity checks are performed. Moreover, the SDK for making such components can be easily obtained from Universal Robots. An attacker could exploit this flaw by crafting a custom component with the SDK, performing Person-In-The-Middle attacks (PITM) and shipping the maliciously-crafted component on demand.

Universal Robots Robot Controllers Version CB2 SW Version 1.4 upwards, CB3 SW Version 3.0 and upwards, e-series SW Version 5.0 and upwards expose a service called DashBoard server at port 29999 that allows for control over core robot functions like starting/stopping programs, shutdown, reset safety and more. The DashBoard server is not protected by any kind of authentication or authorization.