The NIST SP 800-90A default statement of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm contains point Q constants with a possible relationship to certain “skeleton key” values, which might allow context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of those values. NOTE: this is a preliminary CVE for Dual_EC_DRBG; future research may provide additional details about point Q and associated attacks, and could potentially lead to a RECAST or REJECT of this CVE.
CWE-1240
CVE-2020-6616
Some Broadcom chips mishandle Bluetooth random-number generation because a low-entropy Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) is used in situations where a Hardware Random Number Generator (HRNG) should have been used to prevent spoofing. This affects, for example, Samsung Galaxy S8, S8+, and Note8 devices with the BCM4361 chipset. The Samsung ID is SVE-2020-16882 (May 2020).
CVE-2020-4778
IBM Curam Social Program Management 7.0.9 and 7.0.10 uses MD5 algorithm for hashing token in a single instance which less safe than default SHA-256 cryptographic algorithm used throughout the Cúram application. IBM X-Force ID: 189156.
CVE-2020-14254
TLS-RSA cipher suites are not disabled in HCL BigFix Inventory up to v10.0.2. If TLS 2.0 and secure ciphers are not enabled then an attacker can passively record traffic and later decrypt it.
CVE-2019-3907
Premisys Identicard version 3.1.190 stores user credentials and other sensitive information with a known weak encryption method (MD5 hash of a salt and password).
CVE-2019-1543
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored. It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a reused nonce. Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. OpenSSL versions 1.1.1 and 1.1.0 are affected by this issue. Due to the limited scope of affected deployments this has been assessed as low severity and therefore we are not creating new releases at this time. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1c (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1b). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0k (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0j).