CWE-203

A timing side channel was discovered in AT91bootstrap before 3.9.2. It can be exploited by attackers with physical access to forge CMAC values and subsequently boot arbitrary code on an affected system.

An issue was discovered in AvertX Auto focus Night Vision HD Indoor/Outdoor IP Dome Camera HD838 and Night Vision HD Indoor/Outdoor Mini IP Bullet Camera HD438. Failed web UI login attempts elicit different responses depending on whether a user account exists. Because the responses indicate whether a submitted username is valid or not, they make it easier to identify legitimate usernames. If a login request is sent to ISAPI/Security/sessionLogin/capabilities using a username that exists, it will return the value of the salt given to that username, even if the password is incorrect. However, if a login request is sent using a username that is not present in the database, it will return an empty salt value. This allows attackers to enumerate legitimate usernames, facilitating brute-force attacks. NOTE: this is different from CVE-2020-7057.

Fixed in v1.5.1, Argo version v1.5.0 was vulnerable to a user-enumeration vulnerability which allowed attackers to determine the usernames of valid (non-SSO) accounts because /api/v1/session returned 401 for an existing username and 404 otherwise.

In TYPO3 CMS versions 10.4.0 and 10.4.1, it has been discovered that time-based attacks can be used with the password reset functionality for backend users. This allows an attacker to mount user enumeration based on email addresses assigned to backend user accounts. This has been fixed in 10.4.2.

An issue was discovered in Arm Mbed TLS before 2.16.6 and 2.7.x before 2.7.15. An attacker that can get precise enough side-channel measurements can recover the long-term ECDSA private key by (1) reconstructing the projective coordinate of the result of scalar multiplication by exploiting side channels in the conversion to affine coordinates; (2) using an attack described by Naccache, Smart, and Stern in 2003 to recover a few bits of the ephemeral scalar from those projective coordinates via several measurements; and (3) using a lattice attack to get from there to the long-term ECDSA private key used for the signatures. Typically an attacker would have sufficient access when attacking an SGX enclave and controlling the untrusted OS.