CWE-294

Dr Trust USA iCheck Connect BP Monitor BP Testing 118 1.2.1 is vulnerable to a Replay Attack to BP Monitoring.

In SOOIL Developments Co., Ltd Diabecare RS, AnyDana-i and AnyDana-A, the communication protocol of the insulin pump and its AnyDana-i and AnyDana-A mobile applications lacks replay protection measures, which allows unauthenticated, physically proximate attackers to replay communication sequences via Bluetooth Low Energy.

Veritas APTARE versions prior to 10.5 included code that bypassed the normal login process when specific authentication credentials were provided to the server. An unauthenticated user could login to the application and gain access to the data and functionality accessible to the targeted user account.

Every login in tangro Business Workflow before 1.18.1 generates the same JWT token, which allows an attacker to reuse the token when a session is active. The JWT token does not contain an expiration timestamp.

A flaw was found in the Cephx authentication protocol in versions before 15.2.6 and before 14.2.14, where it does not verify Ceph clients correctly and is then vulnerable to replay attacks in Nautilus. This flaw allows an attacker with access to the Ceph cluster network to authenticate with the Ceph service via a packet sniffer and perform actions allowed by the Ceph service. This issue is a reintroduction of CVE-2018-1128, affecting the msgr2 protocol. The msgr 2 protocol is used for all communication except older clients that do not support the msgr2 protocol. The msgr1 protocol is not affected. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to confidentiality, integrity, and system availability.

** DISPUTED ** An issue was discovered in the GAEN (aka Google/Apple Exposure Notifications) protocol through 2020-10-05, as used in COVID-19 applications on Android and iOS. The encrypted metadata block with a TX value lacks a checksum, allowing bitflipping to amplify a contamination attack. This can cause metadata deanonymization and risk-score inflation. NOTE: the vendor’s position is “We do not believe that TX power authentication would be a useful defense against relay attacks.”