CWE-327

** DISPUTED ** airhost.exe in Zoom Client for Meetings 4.6.11 uses the SHA-256 hash of 0123425234234fsdfsdr3242 for initialization of an OpenSSL EVP AES-256 CBC context. NOTE: the vendor states that this initialization only occurs within unreachable code.

Zoom Client for Meetings through 4.6.9 uses the ECB mode of AES for video and audio encryption. Within a meeting, all participants use a single 128-bit key.

In GLPI before version 9.5.0, the encryption algorithm used is insecure. The security of the data encrypted relies on the password used, if a user sets a weak/predictable password, an attacker could decrypt data. This is fixed in version 9.5.0 by using a more secure encryption library. The library chosen is sodium.

In GLPI after version 0.83.3 and before version 9.4.6, the CSRF tokens are generated using an insecure algorithm. The implementation uses rand and uniqid and MD5 which does not provide secure values. This is fixed in version 9.4.6.

The WindowsHello open source library (NuGet HaemmerElectronics.SeppPenner.WindowsHello), before version 1.0.4, has a vulnerability where encrypted data could potentially be decrypted without needing authentication. If the library is used to encrypt text and write the output to a txt file, another executable could be able to decrypt the text using the static method NCryptDecrypt from this same library without the need to use Windows Hello Authentication again. This has been patched in version 1.0.4.

An issue was discovered in Arm Mbed TLS before 2.16.6 and 2.7.x before 2.7.15. An attacker that can get precise enough side-channel measurements can recover the long-term ECDSA private key by (1) reconstructing the projective coordinate of the result of scalar multiplication by exploiting side channels in the conversion to affine coordinates; (2) using an attack described by Naccache, Smart, and Stern in 2003 to recover a few bits of the ephemeral scalar from those projective coordinates via several measurements; and (3) using a lattice attack to get from there to the long-term ECDSA private key used for the signatures. Typically an attacker would have sufficient access when attacking an SGX enclave and controlling the untrusted OS.