CWE-522

Jenkins Dynamic Extended Choice Parameter Plugin 1.0.1 and earlier stores a password unencrypted in job config.xml files on the Jenkins master where it can be viewed by users with Extended Read permission, or access to the master file system.

Jenkins Debian Package Builder Plugin 1.6.11 and earlier stores a GPG passphrase unencrypted in its global configuration file on the Jenkins master where it can be viewed by users with access to the master file system.

Jenkins Fortify Plugin 19.1.29 and earlier stores proxy server passwords unencrypted in job config.xml files on the Jenkins master where they can be viewed by users with Extended Read permission, or access to the master file system.

Jenkins Redgate SQL Change Automation Plugin 2.0.4 and earlier stored an API key unencrypted in job config.xml files on the Jenkins master where they could be viewed by users with Extended Read permission, or access to the master file system.

Passwords are stored in plain text within the configuration of SICK Package Analytics software up to and including V04.1.1. An authorized attacker could access these stored plaintext credentials and gain access to the ftp service. Storing a password in plaintext allows attackers to easily gain access to systems, potentially compromising personal information or other sensitive information.

TechSupport files generated on Palo Alto Networks VM Series firewalls for Microsoft Azure platform configured with high availability (HA) inadvertently collect Azure dashboard service account credentials. These credentials are equivalent to the credentials associated with the Contributor role in Azure. A user with the credentials will be able to manage all the Azure resources in the subscription except for granting access to other resources. These credentials do not allow login access to the VMs themselves. This issue affects VM Series Plugin versions before 1.0.9 for PAN-OS 9.0. This issue does not affect VM Series in non-HA configurations or on other cloud platforms. It does not affect hardware firewall appliances. Since becoming aware of the issue, Palo Alto Networks has safely deleted all the tech support files with the credentials. We now filter and remove these credentials from all TechSupport files sent to us. The TechSupport files uploaded to Palo Alto Networks systems were only accessible by authorized personnel with valid Palo Alto Networks credentials. We do not have any evidence of malicious access or use of these credentials.