CWE-527 Archives - CVE Vulnerability https://cvevulnerability.com/cwe_categories/cwe-527/ Thu, 23 Feb 2023 14:07:01 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=7.0 https://cvevulnerability.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/cropped-Screenshot-2023-02-27-at-3.52.32-PM-32x32.png CWE-527 Archives - CVE Vulnerability https://cvevulnerability.com/cwe_categories/cwe-527/ 32 32 CVE-2021-21423 https://cvevulnerability.com/cve_vulnerabilities/cve-2021-21423/ Thu, 23 Feb 2023 14:07:01 +0000 http://www.cvevulnerability.com/cve_vulnerabilities/cve-2021-21423/ `projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen’s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution […]

The post CVE-2021-21423 appeared first on CVE Vulnerability.

]]> `projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen’s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the “main” repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the “main” repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch.

The post CVE-2021-21423 appeared first on CVE Vulnerability.

]]>