BookWyrm is a social network for tracking your reading, talking about books, writing reviews, and discovering what to read next. Some links in BookWyrm may be vulnerable to tabnabbing, a form of phishing that gives attackers an opportunity to redirect a user to a malicious site. The issue was patched in version 0.4.5.

TensorFlow is an open source platform for machine learning. The `UnbatchGradOp` function takes an argument `id` that is assumed to be a scalar. A nonscalar `id` can trigger a `CHECK` failure and crash the program. It also requires its argument `batch_index` to contain three times the number of elements as indicated in its `batch_index.dim_size(0)`. An incorrect `batch_index` can trigger a `CHECK` failure and crash the program. We have patched the issue in GitHub commit 5f945fc6409a3c1e90d6970c9292f805f6e6ddf2. The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.10.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.9.1, TensorFlow 2.8.1, and TensorFlow 2.7.2, as these are also affected and still in supported range. There are no known workarounds for this issue.

Redis is an in-memory database that persists on disk. Versions 7.0.0 and above, prior to 7.0.5 are vulnerable to an Integer Overflow. Executing an `XAUTOCLAIM` command on a stream key in a specific state, with a specially crafted `COUNT` argument may cause an integer overflow, a subsequent heap overflow, and potentially lead to remote code execution. This has been patched in Redis version 7.0.5. No known workarounds exist.

A vulnerability was found in Linux Kernel. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is the function sess_free_buffer of the file fs/cifs/sess.c of the component CIFS Handler. The manipulation leads to double free. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-211364.

undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`undici` is vulnerable to SSRF (Server-side Request Forgery) when an application takes in **user input** into the `path/pathname` option of `undici.request`. If a user specifies a URL such as `http://127.0.0.1` or `//127.0.0.1` “`js const undici = require(“undici”) undici.request({origin: “http://example.com”, pathname: “//127.0.0.1”}) “` Instead of processing the request as `http://example.org//127.0.0.1` (or `http://example.org/http://127.0.0.1` when `http://127.0.0.1 is used`), it actually processes the request as `http://127.0.0.1/` and sends it to `http://127.0.0.1`. If a developer passes in user input into `path` parameter of `undici.request`, it can result in an _SSRF_ as they will assume that the hostname cannot change, when in actual fact it can change because the specified path parameter is combined with the base URL. This issue was fixed in `undici@5.8.1`. The best workaround is to validate user input before passing it to the `undici.request` call.

undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`=< undici@5.8.0` users are vulnerable to _CRLF Injection_ on headers when using unsanitized input as request headers, more specifically, inside the `content-type` header. Example: ``` import { request } from 'undici' const unsanitizedContentTypeInput = 'application/jsonrnrnGET /foo2 HTTP/1.1' await request('http://localhost:3000, { method: 'GET', headers: { 'content-type': unsanitizedContentTypeInput }, }) ``` The above snippet will perform two requests in a single `request` API call: 1) `http://localhost:3000/` 2) `http://localhost:3000/foo2` This issue was patched in Undici v5.8.1. Sanitize input when sending content-type headers using user input as a workaround.