The Bently Nevada 3700 series of condition monitoring equipment through 2022-04-29 has a maintenance interface on port 4001/TCP with undocumented, hardcoded credentials. An attacker capable of connecting to this interface can thus trivially take over its functionality.

Bently Nevada condition monitoring equipment through 2022-04-29 mishandles authentication. It utilizes the TDI command and data protocols (60005/TCP, 60007/TCP) for communications between the monitoring controller and System 1 and/or Bently Nevada Monitor Configuration (BNMC) software. These protocols provide configuration management and historical data related functionality. Neither protocol has any authentication features, allowing any attacker capable of communicating with the ports in question to invoke (a subset of) desired functionality.

JTEKT TOYOPUC PLCs through 2022-04-29 mishandle authentication. They utilize the CMPLink/TCP protocol (configurable on ports 1024-65534 on either TCP or UDP) for a wide variety of engineering purposes such as starting and stopping the PLC, downloading and uploading projects, and changing configuration settings. This protocol does not have any authentication features, allowing any attacker capable of communicating with the port in question to invoke (a subset of) desired functionality.

Incorrect handling of the supplementary groups in the CRI-O container engine might lead to sensitive information disclosure or possible data modification if an attacker has direct access to the affected container where supplementary groups are used to set access permissions and is able to execute a binary code in that container.