ConnectWise Control before 22.9.10032 (formerly known as ScreenConnect) fails to validate user-supplied parameters such as the Bin/ConnectWiseControl.Client.exe h parameter. This results in reflected data and injection of malicious code into a downloaded executable. The executable can be used to execute malicious queries or as a denial-of-service vector.

The cryptographic code signing process and controls on ConnectWise Control through 22.9.10032 (formerly known as ScreenConnect) are cryptographically flawed. An attacker can remotely generate or locally alter file contents and bypass code-signing controls. This can be used to execute code as a trusted application provider, escalate privileges, or execute arbitrary commands in the context of the user. The attacker tampers with a trusted, signed executable in transit.

Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform. All users of Nautobot versions earlier than 1.5.7 are impacted by a remote code execution vulnerability. Nautobot did not properly sandbox Jinja2 template rendering. In Nautobot 1.5.7 has enabled sandboxed environments for the Jinja2 template engine used internally for template rendering for the following objects: `extras.ComputedField`, `extras.CustomLink`, `extras.ExportTemplate`, `extras.Secret`, `extras.Webhook`. While no active exploits of this vulnerability are known this change has been made as a preventative measure to protect against any potential remote code execution attacks utilizing maliciously crafted template code. This change forces the Jinja2 template engine to use a `SandboxedEnvironment` on all new installations of Nautobot. This addresses any potential unsafe code execution everywhere the helper function `nautobot.utilities.utils.render_jinja2` is called. Additionally, the documentation that had previously suggesting the direct use of `jinja2.Template` has been revised to suggest `render_jinja2`. Users are advised to upgrade to Nautobot 1.5.7 or newer. For users that are unable to upgrade to the latest release of Nautobot, you may add the following setting to your `nautobot_config.py` to apply the sandbox environment enforcement: `TEMPLATES[1][“OPTIONS”][“environment”] = “jinja2.sandbox.SandboxedEnvironment”` After applying this change, you must restart all Nautobot services, including any Celery worker processes. **Note:** *Nautobot specifies two template engines by default, the first being “django” for the Django built-in template engine, and the second being “jinja” for the Jinja2 template engine. This recommended setting will update the second item in the list of template engines, which is the Jinja2 engine.* For users that are unable to immediately update their configuration such as if a Nautobot service restart is too disruptive to operations, access to provide custom Jinja2 template values may be mitigated using permissions to restrict “change” (write) actions to the affected object types listed in the first section. **Note:** *This solution is intended to be stopgap until you can successfully update your `nautobot_config.py` or upgrade your Nautobot instance to apply the sandboxed environment enforcement.*

notation-go is a collection of libraries for supporting Notation sign, verify, push, and pull of oci artifacts. Prior to version 1.0.0-rc.3, notation-go users will find their application using excessive memory when verifying signatures. The application will be killed, and thus availability is impacted. The problem has been patched in the release v1.0.0-rc.3. Some workarounds are available. Users can review their own trust policy file and check if the identity string contains `=#`. Meanwhile, users should only put trusted certificates in their trust stores referenced by their own trust policy files, and make sure the `authenticity` validation is set to `enforce`.

node-jose is a JavaScript implementation of the JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) for web browsers and node.js-based servers. Prior to version 2.2.0, when using the non-default “fallback” crypto back-end, ECC operations in `node-jose` can trigger a Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition, due to a possible infinite loop in an internal calculation. For some ECC operations, this condition is triggered randomly; for others, it can be triggered by malicious input. The issue has been patched in version 2.2.0. Since this issue is only present in the “fallback” crypto implementation, it can be avoided by ensuring that either WebCrypto or the Node `crypto` module is available in the JS environment where `node-jose` is being run.