CWE-20

Incorrect handling of googlechrome:// URL scheme on iOS in Intents in Google Chrome prior to 70.0.3538.67 allowed a remote attacker to escape the sandbox via a crafted HTML page.

Insufficient data validation in filesystem URIs in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted domain name.

When a client request to a cluster node was replicated to other nodes in the cluster for verification, the Content-Length was forwarded. On a DELETE request, the body was ignored, but if the initial request had a Content-Length value other than 0, the receiving nodes would wait for the body and eventually timeout. Mitigation: The fix to check DELETE requests and overwrite non-zero Content-Length header values was applied on the Apache NiFi 1.8.0 release. Users running a prior 1.x release should upgrade to the appropriate release.

In Bro through 2.5.5, there is a DoS in IRC protocol names command parsing in analyzer/protocol/irc/IRC.cc.

The AjaxControl component of Oracle WebCenter Interaction Portal 10.3.3 does not validate the names of pages when processing page rename requests. Pages can be renamed to include characters unsupported for URIs by the web server hosting the WCI Portal software (such as IIS). Renaming pages to include unsupported characters, such as 0x7f, prevents these pages from being accessed over the web server, causing a Denial of Service (DoS) to the page. NOTE: this CVE is assigned by MITRE and isn’t validated by Oracle because Oracle WebCenter Interaction Portal is out of support.

In Go before 1.10.6 and 1.11.x before 1.11.3, the “go get” command is vulnerable to remote code execution when executed with the -u flag and the import path of a malicious Go package, or a package that imports it directly or indirectly. Specifically, it is only vulnerable in GOPATH mode, but not in module mode (the distinction is documented at https://golang.org/cmd/go/#hdr-Module_aware_go_get). Using custom domains, it’s possible to arrange things so that a Git repository is cloned to a folder named “.git” by using a vanity import path that ends with “/.git”. If the Git repository root contains a “HEAD” file, a “config” file, an “objects” directory, a “refs” directory, with some work to ensure the proper ordering of operations, “go get -u” can be tricked into considering the parent directory as a repository root, and running Git commands on it. That will use the “config” file in the original Git repository root for its configuration, and if that config file contains malicious commands, they will execute on the system running “go get -u”.