CWE-347

The vulnerability is that IDToken verifier does not verify if token is properly signed. Signature verification makes sure that the token’s payload comes from valid provider, not from someone else. An attacker can provide a compromised token with custom payload. The token will pass the validation on the client side. We recommend upgrading to version 1.33.3 or above

If Apache Pulsar is configured to authenticate clients using tokens based on JSON Web Tokens (JWT), the signature of the token is not validated if the algorithm of the presented token is set to “none”. This allows an attacker to connect to Pulsar instances as any user (incl. admins).

Lotus is an Implementation of the Filecoin protocol written in Go. BLS signature validation in lotus uses blst library method VerifyCompressed. This method accepts signatures in 2 forms: “serialized”, and “compressed”, meaning that BLS signatures can be provided as either of 2 unique byte arrays. Lotus block validation functions perform a uniqueness check on provided blocks. Two blocks are considered distinct if the CIDs of their blockheader do not match. The CID method for blockheader includes the BlockSig of the block. The result of these issues is that it would be possible to punish miners for valid blocks, as there are two different valid block CIDs available for each block, even though this must be unique. By switching from the go based `blst` bindings over to the bindings in `filecoin-ffi`, the code paths now ensure that all signatures are compressed by size and the way they are deserialized. This happened in https://github.com/filecoin-project/lotus/pull/5393.

PySAML2 is a pure python implementation of SAML Version 2 Standard. PySAML2 before 6.5.0 has an improper verification of cryptographic signature vulnerability. All users of pysaml2 that need to validate signed SAML documents are impacted. The vulnerability is a variant of XML Signature wrapping because it did not validate the SAML document against an XML schema. This allowed invalid XML documents to be processed and such a document can trick pysaml2 with a wrapped signature. This is fixed in PySAML2 6.5.0.

PySAML2 is a pure python implementation of SAML Version 2 Standard. PySAML2 before 6.5.0 has an improper verification of cryptographic signature vulnerability. Users of pysaml2 that use the default CryptoBackendXmlSec1 backend and need to verify signed SAML documents are impacted. PySAML2 does not ensure that a signed SAML document is correctly signed. The default CryptoBackendXmlSec1 backend is using the xmlsec1 binary to verify the signature of signed SAML documents, but by default xmlsec1 accepts any type of key found within the given document. xmlsec1 needs to be configured explicitly to only use only _x509 certificates_ for the verification process of the SAML document signature. This is fixed in PySAML2 6.5.0.